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The Timing of Bid Placement and
Extent of Multiple Bidding: An Empirical
Investigation Using eBay Online Auctions
Sharad Borle, Peter Boatwright and Joseph B. Kadane
Abstract. Online auctions are fast gaining popularity in today’s elec-
tronic commerce. Relative to offline auctions, there is a greater degree
of multiple bidding and late bidding in online auctions, an empirical
finding by some recent research. These two behaviors (multiple bidding
and late bidding) are of “strategic” importance to online auctions and
hence important to investigate.
In this article we empirically measure the distribution of bid timings
and the extent of multiple bidding in a large set of online auctions,
using bidder experience as a mediating variable. We use data from the
popular auction site www.eBay.com to investigate more than 10,000
auctions from 15 consumer product categories. We estimate the distri-
bution of late bidding and multiple bidding, which allows us to place
these product categories along a continuum of these metrics (the ex-
tent of late bidding and the extent of multiple bidding). Interestingly,
the results of the analysis distinguish most of the product categories
from one another with respect to these metrics, implying that product
categories, after controlling for bidder experience, differ in the extent
of multiple bidding and late bidding observed in them.
We also find a nonmonotonic impact of bidder experience on the
timing of bid placements. Experienced bidders are “more” active either
toward the close of auction or toward the start of auction. The impact
of experience on the extent of multiple bidding, though, is monotonic
across the auction interval; more experienced bidders tend to indulge
“less” in multiple bidding.
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0. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, online auctions have gained
immense popularity and perhaps are the most pop-
ular form of electronic commerce (Lucking-Reiley,
2000). Most online auction formats are a variant
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of second-price sealed-bid auction. For example, the
auction format followed by eBay is a second-price
auction incorporating features of an English outcry
auction as well as the second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion. The auction has a fixed ending time (a hard-
close auction) and it allocates the object to the bid-
der with the highest valuation (the “maximum bid”)
at a price which is a small increment above the sec-
ond highest “maximum bid.” For further details see
eBay’s auction site, as well as Bajari and Hortac¸su
(2003a, b), Ockenfels and Roth (2006) and Roth and
Ockenfels (2002).
In this paper, we study the extent of late and mul-
tiple bidding observed in these auctions. “Late” bid-
ding (also referred to as “sniping”) in this context
is the tendency of a bidder to put in a bid close
to the end of an auction, while “multiple bidding”
refers to the tendency of bidders to revise their bids
as the auction progresses. Late and multiple bid-
ding is a common occurrence and occurs despite the
recommendations of the auction site against such
behavior (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002).
We investigate distributions of the extent of late
bidding and multiple bidding across eBay auctions
in a set of 15 consumer product categories after con-
trolling for the effect of bidder experience. We find
that most of the categories significantly differ from
one another in their extent of late bidding and multi-
ple bidding. We introduce metrics (which we call the
“extent of late bidding” and the “extent of multiple
bidding”) and rank the categories on these metrics.
We then argue that the ranking procedure may be
a useful step toward building empirical measures of
the extent of common/private values in an auction
[empirically distinguishing common/private values
is an important challenge faced by auction analysts
and designers (Armantier, 2002)].
As for the impact of experience (bidder experi-
ence) on the extent of late bidding, we find that the
impact is nonmonotonic, in that higher-experience
bidders bid either earlier or later in the auction;
that is, the start and close of an auction see a greater
participation by experienced bidders than the mid-
time interval of an auction. The impact of experience
on multiplicity of bids is in line with that reported
earlier in the literature; namely, greater experience
reduces the extent of multiple bidding.
1. THE DATA
The data were collected from the online auction
site www.eBay.com from August 2001 to February
2002 across 27 products in 15 consumer product
categories. Bidding histories of all successfully com-
pleted auctions (with at least two bids) were recorded.
eBay also has “Dutch” auctions in which bidders
compete for multiple quantities of a single item and
“private” auctions in which the identities and feed-
back numbers of bidders are not revealed. These
auctions were excluded in our analysis. The infor-
mation for our study was at the level of individ-
ual participants and individual auctions, where the
specific data we obtained for each auction were the
start and end date/time, identifying information for
each bidder, each bidder’s experience and every bid’s
date/time. eBay has a point system for every par-
ticipant which is the net of number of positive and
negative feedbacks received by that person. We use
this as a proxy for the reputation/experience level
of the buyer after appropriately rescaling it to lie
in the set of positive integers (Wilcox, 2000). The
data were collected by manually querying eBay’s
completed auctions database and copying data from
those pages. A more efficient way of data collection
would have been the use of automated agents (pop-
ularly known as “web spiders”) which greatly in-
crease the efficiency of data collection [in terms of
amounts of data collected as well as errors in the
collection process (Bapna et al., 2005)]. With the
large amounts of freely available web-based data, is-
sues such as collection of “representative data” also
become important (see Shmueli, Jank and Bapna,
2005 for a discussion of various practical and method-
ological issues surrounding sampling web-based
data).
Table 1 lists the products across which auction
data were collected. It also lists the number of auc-
tions for each product category and the average num-
ber of bids and bidders in these auctions. There were
a total of 10,144 auctions across these 15 product
categories with 55,852 individual bidders participat-
ing in these auctions. The category premium wrist-
watches realized the highest number of bids per auc-
tion and the category hair dryer realized the lowest
number of bids per auction. These categories respec-
tively also had the largest and the smallest number
of bidders per auction. The 15 product categories
were chosen so as to have a wide spread of auctions
based on our prior subjective judgments on the cer-
tainty of private values in these categories (later in
the text, in the section on estimated coefficients, we
provide a brief discussion of private/common value
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Table 1
The products for which auction data were collected
Product category Brands Number of
auctions
Mean number
of bids per
auction
Mean
number of
bidders per
auction
Collectible pottery Rookwood and Roseville
vase
1459 10.1 5.8
Sunglasses Gucci, Oakley 1372 12.1 6.3
Golf balls Callaway, Titleist 1282 8.9 5.5
Premium wristwatches Cartier, Rolex 906 15.4 7.6
Premium writing pens Cross, Waterman 659 6.9 4.2
Computer accessories Dell 17” non LCD monitor,
HP inkjet color printer
652 8.9 5.4
Golf club bags Callaway, Ping 503 12.4 6.2
Neckties Brioni, Zegna 499 6.2 3.8
Desktop accessories Stapler and tape dispenser
(any brand)
492 5.5 3.4
Handheld calculators Casio, Sharp 474 6.3 3.5
Luggage bags American Tourister, Sam-
sonite
446 7.7 4.1
Men’s electric shavers Any brand 421 9.6 5.4
Electric drills Dewalt cordless drill 393 13.7 7.5
Telescopes and microscopes Bausch and Lomb micro-
scope, Celestron telescope
333 12.7 6.6
Hair dryer Any brand 253 5.3 3.2
MEAN 676 9.4 5.2
auctions). The majority of the auctions were of seven-
day duration (56% of all auctions) followed by three-
and five-day durations (19% and 16%, resp.). The
longest duration auctions were for 10 days (about
9% of all auctions), and the minimum duration was
two days (four auctions in all).
One of the variables used in our analysis is the
concentration ratio of bids [(time left)/(total time)],
where total time is the duration of auction and time
left is the gap between bid-time and the end-of-
auction-time. Figure 1(a) is a histogram plot of this
variable across all auctions and all final bids. Fur-
ther, Figure 1(b) is a histogram plot of the actual
time left (in hours) for the final bids of bidders
in these auctions. For sake of visual clarity Fig-
ure 1(b) consists only of seven-day duration auc-
tions; the pattern of the plot, however, does not
change if all auctions are included. Almost 17% of
all bids are placed in the last hour. About 38% of
these (all bids received in the last hour) are re-
ceived in the final minute, implying that almost 6%
of all bids are received in the last one minute of
the auction. It is also interesting that the modes of
the plot nearly correspond to intervals of 24 hours,
which perhaps indicates that particular hours within
a day see increased auction activity in terms of bid
placement/start-of-auction. This result echoes simi-
lar usage regularities observed in use of online search
engines (Telang, Boatwright and Mukhopadhyay, 2004).
Figure 2 throws further light on the timing of bid
placements/start-of-auction. This figure is a histogram
plot of the hour of the day the bids are placed and
the hour of the day the seller starts his/her auc-
tion. As seen from the figure, the most popular time
to start an auction is 1900 hr PST (7:00 pm) (the
darker columns in the figure). (Note that PST is
Pacific Standard Time, USA which is three hours
behind Eastern Standard Time, USA.) Further, the
time period 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm is the peak time
of the day for sellers to start their auctions. This is
also the peak time for the bidders to put in their
bids (the lighter columns in Figure 2). We do not
have information on the geographical location of
bidders; it is reasonable to assume that a majority
of them are within the United States across all time
zones. All sellers, however, are based in the United
States.
Figure 3 is a histogram plot of the number of bids
per bidder in an auction. This is an indication of the
4 A. BORLE, P. BOATWRIGHT AND J. B. KADANE
Fig. 1. (a) Concentration ratio of bids (time left/auction duration) (for the final bids of bidders in all auctions). (b) Time
gap between bid placement and end of auction ( for the final bids of bidders in all seven day auctions).
extent of multiple bidding observed across these auc-
tions; an average bidder across all categories places
approximately two bids per auction. A majority of
the bidders (63% of all bidders) place just a single
bid per auction; however, 10% of them place four or
more bids per auction.
Our measure of bidder experience is based on eBay’s
feedback point system which is the net of number of
positive and negative feedbacks received to date on
each participant. We use this feedback measure as
a proxy for the reputation/experience level of the
buyer after appropriately rescaling it to lie in the
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Fig. 2. Hour of the day of bid placement and start of auction (for the final bids of bidders in all auctions).
set of positive integers (Wilcox, 2000). In eBay’s sys-
tem, it is buyers and sellers that receive feedback,
so our experience measure reflects the propensity
of individuals to complete auctions, either as buyer
or seller. An alternative measure of experience, al-
though unavailable to us, would be a total count of
the number of bids that each bidder has placed in
a specific time period. The second measure reflects
participation, regardless of the nature of that partic-
ipation. Both measures would be correlated with ex-
perience and could serve as reasonable proxies. One
drawback of the participation measure is that par-
ticipation does not fully equate with the notion of
“experience.” In the end, we use the measure that is
available to us, which also happens to be that which
has been used in the literature (Wilcox, 2000).
The relationship between bidder experience and
the timing of bid placement (of the final bid of a
bidder) is shown in Figure 4. On the horizontal axis
is the concentration ratio of bids [(time left)/(total
time)], where total time is the duration of auction
and time left is the time gap between the bid-time
and the end-of-auction-time. On the vertical axis is
the bidder experience level. For visual clarity expe-
rience level is plotted in a logarithmic scale after ap-
propriately scaling it and a random sample of 10,000
bids is plotted instead of all the bids.
An interesting feature of this plot is the nonmonoto-
nic effect of bidder experience on the timing of bid
placements (concentration ratio). One can notice in-
creased “clustering” close to the beginning (right-
hand side of the plot) and close to the end of auction
(left-hand side of the plot), as compared to the mid-
dle interval of the auction. Any analysis of such data
should allow for such an effect of bidder experience
on the timing of bids. In the next section we intro-
duce the distributions of bid timing and the extent
of multiple bidding across all 15 product categories.
2. THE MODEL
The approach followed in the estimation is to spec-
ify different distributions for the “timing of bids”
Fig. 3. Bids per person.
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Fig. 4. Bidder experience and concentration ratio of bids (for the final bids of bidders in all auctions).
and the “extent of multiple bids” and introduce
category-specific parameters across these two distri-
butions. These parameters then are used as metrics
to rank-order the product categories based on the
extent of late bidding and the extent of multiple
bidding observed in them.
2.1 Model 1 (the Timing of Bids)
Let Rcik be the concentration ratio of bids [(time
left)/(total time)], where total time is the duration
of auction i in product category c and time left is
the gap between bid-time and end-of-auction-time
for the last bid of bidder k in auction i for product
category c [we consider only the final bid placed by
the bidder; inclusion of all the bids, however, does
not substantially change the results].
Thus Rcik has the domain (0,1); we assume Rcik
to have a beta distribution as follows:
Rcik ∼Beta(αcik, βcik),(1)
logαcik = η+ θ logEXPBcik,(2a)
logβcik = ψ
′
c + δ logEXPBcik,(2b)
where αcik and βcik are parameters for the beta dis-
tribution. Increase in the value αcik(βcik) relative
to βcik(αcik) causes the bulk of the distribution to
move toward the right (left) side [lower (higher) in-
cidence of late bidding]. When both these parame-
ters decrease (increase), the bulk of the distribution
moves away from (toward) the two ends of the dis-
tribution. The variable EXPBcik is the experience
level of a bidder k, in auction i, in product category
c. The parameter ψ′c is the category-specific metric
used to rank-order the product categories based on
the extent of late bidding observed in them. Higher
value of this parameter for a category would indi-
cate greater extent of late bidding in that category
as compared to other categories.
Equations (1) and (2a) suggest that the concen-
tration ratio of bids is a function of the baseline
parameter as specified by ψ′c (2b) (interpreted as a
relative measure of the extent of late bidding across
auctions in various product categories). Further, this
baseline propensity is moderated by the effect of ex-
perience on the part of the bidders (as specified by
δ and θ). A positive value for δ (θ) would imply
greater incidence of “late” (“early”) bidding on the
part of “more” experienced bidders, while a negative
value would imply the opposite. A positive (nega-
tive) value for both δ and θ would imply that with
greater experience bidders tend to put in their bids
away from (close to) the beginning or the end of an
auction.
2.2 Model 2 (the Extent of Multiple Bidding)
Here we use a measure of the extent of multiple
bidding (BIDS cik) as the dependent variable. This
is the total number of bids placed by a bidder k in
auction i in product category c. It is modeled as
a COM-Poisson (Conway–Maxwell–Poisson, CMP)
BID PLACEMENT AND MULTIPLE BIDDING 7
process (Conway and Maxwell, 1961),
BIDS cik ∼ CMP(λcik, ν),(3)
logλcik = ψ
′′
c + γ logEXPBcik,(4)
where λcik and ν are parameters of the COM-Poisson
distribution. The COM–Poisson is a generalization
of the Poisson distribution with an extra parameter
ν that governs decay. It is a distribution with thicker
or thinner tails than the Poisson (Boatwright, Borle
and Kadane, 2003; Shmueli et al., 2005). The Pois-
son, the geometric and the Bernoulli distributions
are special cases of the COM–Poisson (with ν = 1,0
and ∞, resp.).
The parameter λcik, given ν, is proportional to
the expected number of bids per bidder [from the
probability mass function of the COM-Poisson dis-
tribution (Shmueli et al., 2005)]; a “higher” value for
this parameter implies a “greater” extent of multiple
bidding in the auction.
As in model (1), the setup in (3) and (4) suggests
that multiplicity of bids is a function of the base-
line metric ψ′′c (the extent of multiple bidding) [(4)].
Further, this baseline propensity is moderated by
the effect of experience on the part of the bidders as
specified by γ. A positive value for this parameter
would suggest that more experienced bidders tend
to indulge in a greater incidence of multiple bidding
compared to less experienced bidders.
2.3 Model Estimation
The Bayesian specification across the two mod-
els [(1)–(4)] is completed by assigning appropriate
prior distributions to the parameters to be estimated.
The prior distributions andMCMC sampling scheme
used in the analysis are given in the Appendix. The
models are estimated using a MCMC sampling al-
gorithm, details of which can be obtained from the
authors on request.
3. THE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS
Table 2 reports parameter estimates (posterior mean
and standard deviation) not specific to a category
while Table 3 reports estimates of parameters spe-
cific to a category.
The impact of bidder experience on timing of bid
placement is given by θ and δ (Table 2).
Interestingly, both these are estimated to be less
than zero, indicating that with increased experience
the mass of the beta distribution tends to shift to
the two ends. One can interpret this as more ex-
perienced bidders tending to be more “active” at
the beginning of an auction or toward the close of
auction and not in the mid-interval. This nonmono-
tonic impact of bidder experience on bidding times
is an interesting empirical insight not reported ear-
lier. Past work investigating the effect of experience
on bid placement times in eBay auctions (Ockenfels
and Roth, 2002, 2006; Wilcox, 2000) only considered
bids received toward the close of auction and con-
cluded that more experienced bidders tend to bid
“late” rather than “early.” In reporting their empir-
ical results they used a logistic regression with a bi-
nary dependent variable (whether the last bid came
in within 10 minutes or 1 minute of closing), the ex-
perience level being used as an independent variable.
What we find is that in general bidders are more
active toward the close of auction (low values for
the concentration ratio). With increased experience,
however, there is a greater tendency on the part of
the bidders to bid either toward the close or the
beginning of auction. For example, in the category
premium writing pens a high-experience bidder (log
experience = 6) is more than twice as likely to bid
in the first hour of a seven-day auction as opposed
to a low-experience bidder (log experience = 2); the
probability increases from 1.1% to 2.7%. Similarly,
a high-experience bidder is 1.31 times as likely to
bid in the final hour of the auction as opposed to
a low-experience bidder (the probability increases
from 14.5% to 19.0% ). An analysis failing to al-
low for a nonmonotonic impact would have led us
to conclude that with increased bidder experience a
Table 2
Model parameter estimates∗
η −0.95
(0.013)
θ −0.06
(0.004)
δ −0.08
(0.005)
ν∗∗ 0.00
(0.000)
γ −0.18
(0.004)
∗Shaded cells indicate that the 95% posterior interval for the
parameter does not contain 0. The number in parentheses is
the posterior standard deviation.
∗∗In the estimation in the MCMC log(ν) appeared to decrease
without bound. Our best approximation of the result was ν =
0, which is the geometric distribution. The model was re-
estimated setting ν to zero.
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Table 3
Model parameter estimates∗
Product category ψ′
c
ψ′′
c
1 Collectible pottery −0.30 −0.23
(0.023) (0.015)
2 Sunglasses −0.31 −0.27
(0.020) (0.011)
3 Golf balls −0.26 −0.48
(0.021) (0.015)
4 Premium wristwatches −0.61 −0.19
(0.021) (0.012)
5 Premium writing pens −0.19 −0.31
(0.029) (0.021)
6 Computer accessories 0.26 −0.41
(0.028) (0.019)
7 Golf club bags −0.41 −0.26
(0.026) (0.015)
8 Neckties −0.18 −0.37
(0.034) (0.025)
9 Desktop accessories 0.03 −0.28
(0.038) (0.026)
10 Handheld calculators 0.12 −0.27
(0.038) (0.023)
11 Luggage bags 0.01 −0.22
(0.035) (0.020)
12 Men’s electric shavers −0.04 −0.27
(0.031) (0.020)
13 Electric drills −0.27 −0.28
(0.027) (0.017)
14 Telescopes and microscopes −0.39 −0.18
(0.032) (0.019)
15 Hair dryer 0.03 −0.32
(0.049) (0.036)
∗Shaded cells indicate that the 95% posterior interval for the
parameter does not contain 0. The number in parentheses is
the posterior standard deviation.
bidder tends to indulge less in “late” bidding, a re-
sult contrary to past published research. The effect
of experienced bidders bidding closer to the auction
beginning is the stronger effect and in an analysis
not allowing for a nonmonotonic impact outweighs
the effect of bidding toward the close of the auction
(results of this analysis can be obtained from the
authors on request).
The impact of experience on the extent of multiple
bidding is given by the parameter γ (Table 2). Ear-
lier studies (Ockenfels and Roth, 2002, 2006; Wilcox,
2000) have reported that more experienced bidders
tend to put in fewer bids in the same auction. We
also find that more experienced bidders tend to in-
dulge less in multiple bidding as opposed to the less
experienced bidders.
The parameters ψ′c and ψ
′′
c (the relative extent of
late bidding and multiple bidding, resp.) are listed
in Table 3 and are also pictorially represented in
the box plots of Figure 5(a) and 5(b). To ease in-
terpretation the box plots have been arranged from
lower to higher median values, which corresponds
to categories with increasing extent of late bidding
[Figure 5(a)] and multiple bidding [Figure 5(b)].
An interesting feature of the results is that there
is enough variability across categories to differenti-
ate them based on these metrics (the extent of late
bidding/multiple bidding). As per the results, the
category premium wristwatches has the least extent
of late bidding while computer accessories has the
largest extent of late bidding observed among this
set of 15 consumer product categories. Similarly, the
category golf balls has the least extent of multiple
bidding, while the category telescopes and micro-
scopes has the largest extent of multiple bidding ob-
served.
A relevant question to ask here is does the rela-
tive extent of late bidding and multiple bidding in
a product category convey some meaningful infor-
mation? First, the result that after controlling for
bidder experience, categories differ in their extent
of late bidding and multiple bidding is in itself an
interesting empirical result. Second, empirically dis-
tinguishing between a private value (PV) and com-
mon value (CV) environment is one of the important
challenges faced by auction analysts and designers.
In a private value auction each bidder values the
object differently and knows this valuation before
placing the bid. In particular, a bidder’s ex post
utility from winning the object is not affected by
his/her knowledge of other bidders’ valuations, since
there is no additional information gained by observ-
ing the bids of others. In contrast, in a common
value auction the object has the same actual value
to each bidder ex post, even though different bid-
ders may have access to different information about
what that actual value is. Thus, ex ante this value
must be estimated by each bidder and these esti-
mates form a distribution around the true value of
the object. Past research in this area has primarily
used the existence of the winner’s curse to distin-
guish a PV paradigm from a CV paradigm (Paarsch,
1992). In a common value auction the winner is the
bidder who has the highest estimate of the “com-
mon value” of the object being auctioned and post
facto may end up paying more for the object than its
BID PLACEMENT AND MULTIPLE BIDDING 9
Fig. 5. The ψ′
c
parameter (extent of late bidding) (higher values indicate “greater” late bidding). The ψ′′
c
parameter (extent
of multiple bidding) (higher values indicate “greater” multiple bidding).
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true worth; this in short is what is termed the win-
ner’s curse (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982 for fur-
ther explanation of the winner’s curse). Armantier
(2002) uses the winner’s curse to characterize an
auction in an experimental setting; Giliberto and
Varaiya (1989) use it to characterize FDIC (Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation) auctions of failed
banks. Empirically measuring the existence of win-
ner’s curse seems to be a well-established method to
distinguish the two paradigms. The growth of Inter-
net auctions has spawned further interest in auction
theory as applied to these auctions (Lucking-Reiley,
2000). One of the interesting features of these auc-
tions (in comparison to “typical” non-Internet auc-
tions) is the phenomena of late and multiple bid-
ding. As our understanding of the existence of these
phenomena and their linkage to the auction envi-
ronment (a PV or a CV paradigm) grows, we could
then use these as additional empirical measures to
distinguish the PV and the CV auction paradigms.
Based on existing research one might suppose that
the extents of late and of multiple bidding may both
be indices of common as opposed to private value
environment (Hasker, Gonzalez and Sickles, 2004;
Bajari and Hortac¸su, 2003b; Roth and Ockenfels,
2002; Unver, 2002; Wilcox, 2000). However, the fail-
ure of the rankings in Figure 4 to correlate highly
indicates that such an interpretation is questionable
(the Spearman rank correlation −0.496 is not sig-
nificantly different from zero).
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
The growing popularity of online auctions has led
to much research. The eBay auctions are one of the
more prominent among these auctions. Their format
is a variant of the second-price sealed-bid auction
format. Two additional strategic bidder behaviors
(behavior which is not simply due to naive/idiosyncratic
bidding but responds to the structure of the auction)
observed in these auctions, but not in a second-price
sealed-bid auction, are the number of times a bid-
der bids in the same auction (multiplicity of bids)
and the timing (relative to the auction start/end)
of his/her bids. These two behaviors and their im-
plications for auction design are of considerable in-
terest to researchers (Bajari and Hortac¸su, 2003b;
Hasker, Gonzalez and Sickles, 2004; Ockenfels and
Roth, 2002, 2006; Roth and Ockenfels, 2002).
In this paper we investigate over 10,000 auctions
across 15 consumer product categories on the eBay
auction website www.eBay.com and describe the dis-
tribution of the “timing of bids” and the “multi-
plicity of bids” across these product categories. The
Bayesian model used provides a simple and appro-
priate framework in which to incorporate the struc-
ture of the problem and to estimate the relatively
large number of parameters. We introduce metrics
which summarize the relative extent of late bidding
and the relative extent of multiple bidding in an
auction. Using these metrics we are able to rank the
consumer product categories based on the extent of
late bidding and multiple bidding observed in them.
Interestingly, we find that most of the product cate-
gories vary significantly in the extent of late bidding
and multiple bidding observed in them. This varia-
tion (as captured by the metrics) can be an impor-
tant step toward constructing empirical measures
of the extent of common/private values in an on-
line auction (Boatwright, Borle and Kadane, 2005).
Although most past research implies that the ex-
tents of late and of multiple bidding might both be
indices of common as opposed to private value bid-
ding in a category, our results question such an in-
terpretation, in that we do not find these measures
to be correlated.
We also investigate the effect of bidder experience
on the timing of bids and the extent of multiple
bids. As reported in earlier studies, we too find that
increased experience makes bidders indulge less in
multiple bidding (multiple bids placed in the same
auction). However, the effect of greater experience
(on part of the bidders) on bid placement timings
is to move the bids either closer to the auction end
time or closer to the auction begin time (a nonmono-
tonic effect). The more experienced bidders are more
active either toward the beginning of the auction or
toward the close of the auction as compared to the
mid-time interval of the auction. Previous studies
on similar data had ignored this nonmonotonic ef-
fect and concentrated on the bids received close to
the end of auction. This is an interesting empirical
finding and a good avenue for further research.
In this work, we restricted our analysis to com-
pleted auctions, and our results are thus conditional
on auction participation. Incomplete auctions may
also serve as an interesting area for future study.
There are multiple different auction outcomes that
result in incomplete auctions: (a) a seller might with-
draw his or her item, (b) there may be no bids at all,
and (c) there may be no bids that are high enough
to surpass the reservation price. From a statistical
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modeling viewpoint, incomplete auctions may pose
a challenge of sparse data, in that auctions that did
not meet the reserve price might have fewer bids
overall. From a bidding process point of view, future
work could evaluate the extent to which bidders’
choices of auctions are influenced by their assess-
ment of the probability that the auction will proceed
to completion. In addition, future study could inves-
tigate the extent to which such assessments vary by
expertise level.
Another potentially interesting study would uti-
lize data where individuals participate in numerous
auctions and examine individuals’ bidding behavior
across auctions as well as possibly the bidders’ se-
lection of auctions in which to participate. Future
research could also examine how auction bidding is
influenced by daily or weekly Internet usage fluctu-
ations. Finally, future work could examine implica-
tions of bidder experience for the optimal duration
of auctions.
APPENDIX: MCMC SAMPLING SCHEME
AND PRIOR SPECIFICATION
Samplers 1 and 2 are the schematic representa-
tion of the MCMC sampling scheme. The priors
used in the estimation are as follows: δ and ψ′c:
normal(0,100); θ and η: normal(0,100); ν: gamma(2,1);
γ and ψ′′c : normal(0,100). The first model (the tim-
ing of bid placements) corresponding to Sampler 1 is
specified by (1), (2a) and (2b). We need to specify
our priors over the parameters θ, η, δ and ψ′c. The
parameters θ and δ specify the impact of bidder ex-
perience on the bid placement times. A priori we
do not have specific beliefs about their magnitudes;
however, from the empirical distribution (Figure 3)
Sampler 1. The timing of bid placements.
Legend: The variables in boxes are the parameters to be
estimated; those in ellipses are the covariates; those without
boxes/ellipses are the prior parameters.
Sampler 2. The extent of multiple bidding.
Legend: The variables in boxes are the parameters to be
estimated; those in ellipses are the covariates; those without
boxes/ellipses are the prior parameters.
one might expect a negative sign on these parame-
ters. A normal(0,100) is a reasonable representation
of this prior belief. The parameter ψ′c is the relative
measure of extent of late bidding in an auction and η
is the remaining parameter that completes the spec-
ification of the beta distribution. Again, a prior of
normal(0,100) represents our lack of specific infor-
mation about these parameters.
The second model (the extent of multiple bid-
ding) corresponding to Sampler 2 is specified by
(3) and (4). The parameter ν is the decay parameter
of the COM-Poisson distribution and is defined over
the positive real line. A priori, there is little infor-
mation on the range of values ν can take; however,
very high values of ν seem unlikely given the disper-
sion observed in our data. The prior distribution on
ν, a gamma(2,1) with a mode at 1, is a reasonable
representation of our prior belief about the values
ν can take. The parameter ψ′′c is given a prior of
normal(0,100), again representing our lack of spe-
cific information about this parameter. The remain-
ing parameter γ is the impact of bidder experience
on the extent of multiple bidding. As with the cor-
responding parameters in model 1, a normal(0,100)
represents our prior information about this param-
eter.
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